

I Walked the Line:
Identification of Fiscal Multipliers in SVARs

Dario Caldara

IIES Stockholm

IV Oslo Workshop on Economic Policy

Introduction

- ▶ Fiscal policy has been used to counter the impact of the financial crisis.
- ▶ Fiscal multipliers are crucial to understand the impact of fiscal interventions.
- ▶ Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) based evidence:
 - ▶ Large qualitative and quantitative dispersion in results.

Motivation

- ▶ Blanchard & Perotti (2002): Contemporaneous restrictions.
- ▶ Mountford & Uhlig (2009): Sign restrictions (SR).

	1 qrt	4 qrts	8 qrts	12 qrts	20 qrts	Peak
<i>BP identification scheme applied to MU (2009) VAR</i>						
Def.-Fin. G ↑	1.33*	1.40*	0.50	0.72*	-0.10	1.60* (3)
Def.-Fin. T ↓	0.02	0.40	1.09*	1.58*	0.60	1.62* (13)
Bal.-Bud. G ↑	1.31*	1.01*	-0.60	-0.87	-0.64	1.46 (3)
<i>MU (2009)</i>						
Def.-Fin. G ↑	0.65*	0.27	-0.74*	-1.19*	-2.24*	0.65* (1)
Def.-Fin. T ↓	0.28*	0.93	2.05*	3.41*	2.59*	3.57* (13)
Bal.-Bud. G ↑	0.37*	-0.66*	-2.79*	-4.60*	-4.83*	0.37 (3)

Overview of the Paper

- ▶ Starting point: Restrictions on output elasticities of tax revenue and government spending.
- ▶ Describe analytical relation between elasticities and multipliers.
 - ▶ Small changes in elasticities induce large changes in multipliers.
- ▶ Recast identification schemes in terms of elasticities.
 - ▶ Explain differences in results.
- ▶ Compute elasticities from data.
 - ▶ Spending multipliers larger than tax multipliers.

Research Agenda

- ▶ Caldara & Kamps (2007): Explore implications of reduced-form specifications on multipliers.
- ▶ Caldara & Kamps (2010a): Analytics of structural VARs.
- ▶ Caldara & Kamps (2010b): Analytics of sign restrictions.

A Simple Bivariate Model

- ▶ Reduced-form VAR:

$$\begin{bmatrix} Y_t \\ T_t \end{bmatrix} = \mu + A(L) \begin{bmatrix} Y_{t-1} \\ T_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} u_t^Y \\ u_t^T \end{bmatrix}, \text{ with } E(u_t u_t') = \Sigma_u$$

- ▶ Structural model:

$$\begin{aligned} u_t^Y &= c_1 u_t^T + e_t^Y \\ u_t^T &= a_1 u_t^Y + e_t^T \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ B&P (2002) restrict the output elasticity of tax revenue (a_1)
- ▶ Find analytical solution:

$$c_1 = c_1(a_1; \Sigma_u)$$

VAR Model

- ▶ Country: U.S.
- ▶ Sample: 1947:Q1 - 2010:Q1
- ▶ Benchmark model: 3 equations (Y, T, G)
- ▶ Large model: 13 equations
 - ▶ Forward looking variables.
 - ▶ Romer and Romer (2010) and Ramey (2010) measures of fiscal news.

Tax Multiplier

DEFINITION: The tax multiplier is the response in dollars of output to a negative tax shock of size one dollar.


- ▶ Impact tax multiplier:

$$\begin{aligned} TM_0(a_1; \Sigma_u) &= (-1) \frac{c_1(a_1; \Sigma_u)}{1 - a_1 c_1(a_1; \Sigma_u)} \\ &= \frac{a_1 \sigma_{YY} - \sigma_{TY}}{a_1^2 \sigma_{YY} + \sigma_{TT} - 2a_1 \sigma_{TY}} \end{aligned}$$


- ▶ This relation generalizes to a k -equation VAR if we impose block recursion.

Impact Tax Multiplier




Impact Tax Multiplier



Impact Tax Multiplier



Tax Multipliers - Longer Horizon



Distribution of a_1 from SR

- ▶ Sign restrictions:

$$\begin{bmatrix} u_t^Y \\ u_t^T \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} d_{11} & d_{12} \\ + & ? \\ d_{21} & d_{22} \\ + & + \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} e_t^Y \\ e_t^T \end{bmatrix}$$

- ▶ We prove that sign restrictions are satisfied for

$$a_1 > 0$$

- ▶ What is the distribution of a_1 ?

- ▶ Pure sign-restriction:

$$a_1 \in (0.84; 6.92)$$

- ▶ Penalty function:

$$a_1 = 2.14$$

Estimated Distribution for a_1

- ▶ The OECD estimates the output elasticity of tax revenue for four different tax categories i :

$$\eta_{T_i,y} = \eta_{T_i,TB_i} \eta_{TB_i,y}$$

where T_i is tax revenue, TB_i is the tax base, and y is the output gap

- ▶ η_{T_i,TB_i} are constructed from legislation
 - ▶ $\eta_{TB_i,y}$ are estimated
-
- ▶ Aggregation:

$$a_1 = \sum_i w_i \eta_{T_i,y}$$

where w_i are weights.

Estimated Distribution of a_1

B&P method of constructing a_1 :

$$a_1 \in (2.00; 2.20)$$

Four methodological issues:

1. Aggregation of sub-elasticities.
2. Elasticity of personal income tax revenue to earnings.
3. Elasticity of wage bill to output.

$$a_1 \in (1.08; 1.12)$$

4. Lack of data for period 1947-1960 \rightarrow work in progress ($a_1 \uparrow$)

Distributions of a_1

Method	Distribution of a_1		$p\left(TM_0 \hat{\Sigma}_{u,OLS}\right)$	
	Median	90% C.S.	Median	68% C.S.
Estimation	1.10	(1.08; 1.12)	-0.31	(-0.32; -0.29)
Sign Restrictions	2.31	(0.84; 6.92)	0.41	(-0.90; 0.98)
Sign Restriction + P.F.	2.14	-	0.63	-

Spending Multiplier

DEFINITION: The spending multiplier is the response in dollars of output to a positive tax shock of size one dollar.

- ▶ Impact spending multiplier:


$$\begin{aligned} GM_0(b_1; \Sigma_u) &= \frac{c_2(b_1; \Sigma_u)}{1 - b_1 c_2(b_1; \Sigma_u)} \\ &= \frac{\sigma_{GY} - b_1 \sigma_{YY}}{b_1^2 \sigma_{YY} + \sigma_{GG} - 2b_1 \sigma_{GY}} \end{aligned}$$

b_1 : output elasticity of spending.

- ▶ $b_1 = 0$:

$$GM_0(b_1 = 0; \Sigma_u) = \frac{\sigma_{YG}}{\sigma_{GG}}$$

Impact Spending Multiplier



Distributions of b_1

Method	Distribution of b_1		$p(GM_0 \hat{\Sigma}_{u,OLS})$	
	Median	68% C.S.	Median	68% C.S.
Blanchard&Perotti	0.00	-	0.59	-
Sign Restrictions	0.16	(-2.26,2.23)	0.15	(-1.41; 1.45)
Sign Restriction + P.F.	0.08	-	0.44	-

- ▶ Small changes in elasticities account for large changes in multipliers.

Policy Experiments

- ▶ Mountford and Uhlig (2009): linear combination of spending and tax shocks.
- ▶ Elasticities: $a_1 = 1.1$; $b_1 = 0$.
- ▶ Three experiments (1 dollar in size):
 - ▶ Deficit financed spending increase.
 - ▶ Deficit financed tax cut.
 - ▶ Balanced-budget spending increase.

Results from 3 Eq VAR

	1 qrt	4 qrts	8 qrts	12 qrts	20 qrts	Maximum
Def.-Fin. G\uparrow	0.55*	0.24	0.49	0.69*	0.50	0.73* (10)
Def.-Fin. T\downarrow	-0.30*	-0.57*	-0.38	-0.14	0.11	0.11 (20)
Bal.-Bud. G\uparrow	0.85*	0.81*	0.87*	0.83*	0.41	1.33* (3)

- ▶ Negative tax multipliers in the short-run.
- ▶ Two explanations:
 - ▶ Omitted variables.
 - ▶ Downward bias in a_1 .

Results from 11 Eq VAR

	1 qrt	4 qrts	8 qrts	12 qrts	20 qrts	Maximum
Def.-Fin. G \uparrow	0.84*	1.05*	1.59*	1.60*	0.85*	1.94* (10)
Def.-Fin. T \downarrow	-0.20*	-0.03	0.59	1.17*	0.55	1.17* (20)
Bal.-Bud. G \uparrow	1.04*	1.08*	1.00*	0.45	0.33	1.45* (3)

- ▶ Multipliers are larger than in 3-eq model.
- ▶ Explanations:
 - ▶ σ_{GG} & $\sigma_{TT} \downarrow \rightarrow$ Multipliers \uparrow
 - ▶ Change in covariance structure

Results from 11 Eq VAR

- ▶ Effects of a deficit-financed spending increase on output components:

	1 qrt	4 qrts	8 qrts	12 qrts	20 qrts	Maximum
Consumption	0.15*	0.39*	0.84*	0.79*	0.45*	0.94*(10)
Res. Invest.	-0.03	0.10	0.26*	0.10	-0.11	0.27*(9)
Non Res. Invest.	-0.01	0.05	0.13	0.31*	0.11	0.34*(11)

Robustness: Distribution for b_1

- ▶ State and local spending: 52% of G .
- ▶ Rodden and Wibbels (2010): data on S&L spending for 49 US states.
 - ▶ OLS regression. Elasticity is 0.17***
- ▶ Assume elasticities of other spending categories are zero.
 - ▶ Overall output elasticity of spending: $b_1 = 0.1$.
- ▶ Work in progress: estimate elasticity of public sector wage bill.
 - ▶ Gomes (2009): Procyclicality of public sector wages.

Results from 11 Eq VAR

- ▶ Robustness: $b_1 = 0.1$

	1 qrt	4 qrts	8 qrts	12 qrts	20 qrts	Maximum
Def.-Fin. G\uparrow	0.64*	0.88*	1.49*	1.45*	0.67	1.82*(10)
Def.-Fin. T\downarrow	-0.20*	-0.10	0.55*	1.14*	0.48	1.14*(12)
Bal.-Bud. G\uparrow	0.84*	0.98*	0.95*	0.34	0.21	1.28*(3)

- ▶ No qualitative change in results.

Conclusions

- ▶ Estimates of fiscal multipliers are sensitive to restrictions on output elasticities of fiscal variables.
- ▶ Disagreement in the literature can be explained by different restrictions on elasticities.
- ▶ Provide inference over fiscal multipliers.

Analytical Solution

- ▶ System of equations:

$$\Sigma_u = A_0^{-1} \Sigma_e (A_0^{-1})'$$

where

$$A_0 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -a_1 \\ -c_1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

- ▶ Solution:

$$c_1 = \frac{a_1 \sigma_{YY} - \sigma_{YT}}{a_1 \sigma_{YT} - \sigma_{TT}}$$

$$\varepsilon_{TT} = \sigma_{TT} + a_1^2 \sigma_{YY} - 2a_1 \sigma_{YT}$$

$$\varepsilon_{YY} = \frac{(\sigma_{TT} + a_1^2 \sigma_{YY} - 2a_1 \sigma_{YT})(\sigma_{TT} \sigma_{YY} - \sigma_{YT}^2)}{(\sigma_{TT} - a_1 \sigma_{YT})^2}$$

Analytical IRFs

- ▶ A^{-1} gives the impact response of model variables to structural shock:

$$A_0^{-1}(a_1; \Sigma_u) = \frac{1}{1 - a_1 c_1(a_1; \Sigma_u)} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & c_1(a_1; \Sigma_u) \\ a_1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

- ▶ Substituting $c_1(a_1; \Sigma_u)$ we obtain:

$$A_0^{-1}(a_1; \Sigma_u) = \frac{1}{\det(A_0)} \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{TT} - a_1 \sigma_{TY}, & \sigma_{TY} - a_1 \sigma_{YY} \\ a_1 (\sigma_{TT} - a_1 \sigma_{TY}), & \sigma_{TT} - a_1 \sigma_{TY} \end{bmatrix}$$

where $\det(A_0) = a_1^2 \sigma_{YY} + \sigma_{TT} - 2a_1 \sigma_{TY}$.

Results from Original Papers

- ▶ Blanchard & Perotti (2002): Contemporaneous restrictions.
- ▶ Mountford & Uhlig (2009): Sign Restrictions.

	1 qrt	4 qrts	8 qrts	12 qrts	20 qrts	Peak
<i>BP (2002)</i>						
Def.-Fin. G ↑	0.96*	0.57	0.79	1.17*	0.85*	1.21* (14)
Def.-Fin. T ↓	0.87*	1.79*	1.92*	1.11*	0.33	1.97* (7)
Bal.-Bud. G ↑	0.09	-1.22*	-1.13	0.06	0.52	0.71 (17)
<i>MU (2009)</i>						
Def.-Fin. G ↑	0.65*	0.27	-0.74*	-1.19*	-2.24*	0.65* (1)
Def.-Fin. T ↓	0.28*	0.93	2.05*	3.41*	2.59*	3.57* (13)
Bal.-Bud. G ↑	0.37*	-0.66*	-2.79*	-4.60*	-4.83*	0.37 (3)